A reasonably foreseeable and reproducible outcome.When a prohibition reaches a model nobody aimed, AI Act Article 5(1a)
Infrastructure and payments
I follow cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, tracking the breaches, the vendors and the NIS2 fallout across Central and Eastern Europe. I like my stories with a threat actor attribution attached.
Between a payment firm and its central bank the pilot agreement answers only for wilful misconduct or gross negligence, and what an end user is owed is whatever their own provider's terms happen to say.
The amended settlement discipline standards replace two allocation deadlines with one, 23:00 CET on the day of the trade. For a client in the same time zone that is a relaxation. For one in Tokyo it is thirteen hours.
We rank three products against third-party risk requirements and put first the one our own publisher operates. The criteria come before the verdict so you can reweight them, and the vendor with the best design here has the thinnest assurance file of the three.
Ten seconds, any hour, irrevocable. The name-check that is supposed to hold the line has a third answer — close match — and the text does not say what happens after it.
The credit is measured per service, per region, claimed by you, and named the only thing you get. The postmortem that follows commits the provider to nothing with a date on it.
The obligation has applied since 17 January 2025 and it presumes a substitute. The substitutable part is the cloud contract; the part that cannot be substituted is a set of libraries nobody has to declare.